Pearl Harbor Sinks Amazon.com, Crowds Cheer
For no real reason, I was thinking about Pearl Harbor over breakfast, and it occured to me that the more oft-cited rationales for the Japanese attacks does not really make sense.
If the History Channel teaches us anything (which it probably doesn't), it's that World War II was the high point of Imperial History, that Roosevelt was the last really Great President, and that rocket documentaries are both a) cool as hell, and b) easy to replay time-and-time-again. But Pearl Harbor, specifically, is one of the most discussed topics, as determined by my non-scientific Random Channel Surfing Survey.
So, the explanation behind the surpise attack goes like this--
1) Japan invades China.
2) US embargoes Japan.
3) Japan remembers that it needs Oil to continue the Manchurian invasion.
4) Japan decides to keep America, its main oil supplier, neutral by destroying the Pacific Fleet.
This Brilliant Idea seems to be two-pronged: a) an America without the Pacific Fleet would be unable to face Japan militarily and would be forced to negotiate diplomatically; and b) after the initial attack, the American government would be willing to cede the Pacific Rim, Munich Agreement-style.
So, this Brilliant Idea was a military bullying tactic. Stimmt.
Was stimmt nicht, is that America does not tolerate bullying tactics, as the Japanese found out. So, does this mean that the Japanese military command was overly impressed with their own successes and military prowess? Did they underestimate Roosevelt's intention/willingness to engage in both the European and Pacific theaters?(1) Did they overestimate their first-strike tactical advantage? Or did they just get the American psychology wrong?
This last point is what I find most interesting, but I have no resources on Japanese psychology available. Could it be that the Japanese are more likely to back down from bullies? Do bullying tactics play a more prominent role in decision-making in Japan? And how does that play out, sociologically?
I seem to remember something about peer-pressuring tactics in Alex Kerr's Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Modern Japan, but I cannot seem to drudge up anything specific from my own memory. Are there any other sources out there that reference this psychologically, especially anything that might have a Japan-Empire comparitive analysis? If you know of or find something, please email me (blog@unquote.ath.cx).
BOOK LINKS ALL POINT TO AMAZON
My link above does, too. I hate that. But I have yet to find an alternative that does the following things:
1) Give detailed publishing information
2) Offer reviews, excerpts, and commentaries
3) Gives visuals (cover, table of contents, pictures, etc.)
4) Lets User order the book
5) Offers a guarantee on the quality of the book's printing
Sigh. Amazon does one thing well. I'm willing to admit that, but I'm still not publishing a wish-list.
(1) Roosevelt had been steering the country towards conflict with Germany since the Munich Conference by using the Merchant Marines as trans-Atlantic arms transports. This made them military targets, according to the Germans. Roosevelt's thinking was that eventually, enough attacks on what he described as "neutral" vessels would force Congress to engage Europe.
If the History Channel teaches us anything (which it probably doesn't), it's that World War II was the high point of Imperial History, that Roosevelt was the last really Great President, and that rocket documentaries are both a) cool as hell, and b) easy to replay time-and-time-again. But Pearl Harbor, specifically, is one of the most discussed topics, as determined by my non-scientific Random Channel Surfing Survey.
So, the explanation behind the surpise attack goes like this--
1) Japan invades China.
2) US embargoes Japan.
3) Japan remembers that it needs Oil to continue the Manchurian invasion.
4) Japan decides to keep America, its main oil supplier, neutral by destroying the Pacific Fleet.
This Brilliant Idea seems to be two-pronged: a) an America without the Pacific Fleet would be unable to face Japan militarily and would be forced to negotiate diplomatically; and b) after the initial attack, the American government would be willing to cede the Pacific Rim, Munich Agreement-style.
So, this Brilliant Idea was a military bullying tactic. Stimmt.
Was stimmt nicht, is that America does not tolerate bullying tactics, as the Japanese found out. So, does this mean that the Japanese military command was overly impressed with their own successes and military prowess? Did they underestimate Roosevelt's intention/willingness to engage in both the European and Pacific theaters?(1) Did they overestimate their first-strike tactical advantage? Or did they just get the American psychology wrong?
This last point is what I find most interesting, but I have no resources on Japanese psychology available. Could it be that the Japanese are more likely to back down from bullies? Do bullying tactics play a more prominent role in decision-making in Japan? And how does that play out, sociologically?
I seem to remember something about peer-pressuring tactics in Alex Kerr's Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Modern Japan, but I cannot seem to drudge up anything specific from my own memory. Are there any other sources out there that reference this psychologically, especially anything that might have a Japan-Empire comparitive analysis? If you know of or find something, please email me (blog@unquote.ath.cx).
BOOK LINKS ALL POINT TO AMAZON
My link above does, too. I hate that. But I have yet to find an alternative that does the following things:
1) Give detailed publishing information
2) Offer reviews, excerpts, and commentaries
3) Gives visuals (cover, table of contents, pictures, etc.)
4) Lets User order the book
5) Offers a guarantee on the quality of the book's printing
Sigh. Amazon does one thing well. I'm willing to admit that, but I'm still not publishing a wish-list.
(1) Roosevelt had been steering the country towards conflict with Germany since the Munich Conference by using the Merchant Marines as trans-Atlantic arms transports. This made them military targets, according to the Germans. Roosevelt's thinking was that eventually, enough attacks on what he described as "neutral" vessels would force Congress to engage Europe.
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